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ABSTRACT The rhetoric of “excellence” is pervasive across the academy. It is used to refer 
to research outputs as well as researchers, theory and education, individuals and organiza-
tions, from art history to zoology. But does “excellence” actually mean anything? Does this 
pervasive narrative of “excellence” do any good? Drawing on a range of sources we inter-
rogate “excellence” as a concept and find that it has no intrinsic meaning in academia. Rather 
it functions as a linguistic interchange mechanism. To investigate whether this linguistic 
function is useful we examine how the rhetoric of excellence combines with narratives of 
scarcity and competition to show that the hyper-competition that arises from the perfor-
mance of “excellence” is completely at odds with the qualities of good research. We trace the 
roots of issues in reproducibility, fraud, and homophily to this rhetoric. But we also show that 
this rhetoric is an internal, and not primarily an external, imposition. We conclude by 
proposing an alternative rhetoric based on soundness and capacity-building. In the final 
analysis, it turns out that that “excellence” is not excellent. Used in its current unqualified 
form it is a pernicious and dangerous rhetoric that undermines the very foundations of good 
research and scholarship. This article is published as part of a collection on the future of 
research assessment. 
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Introduction: the ubiquity of excellence rhetoric 
“Excellence” is the gold standard of the university world. Institutional mission statements or advertisements pro-claim, in almost identical language, their “international 
reputation for [educational] excellence” (for example, Baylor, 
Imperial College London, Loughborough University, Monash 
University, The University of Sheffield), or the extent to which 
they are guided by principles of “excellence” (University of 
Cambridge, Carnegie Mellon, Gustav Adolphus, University 
College London, Warwick and so on). University research offices 
and faculties turn this goal into reality through centres and 
programmes of “excellence”, which are in turn linked through 
networks such as the Canadian “Networks of Centres of 
Excellence” or German “Clusters of Excellence” (OECD, 2014; 
Networks of Centres of Excellence of Canada 2015). Funding 
agencies use “excellence to recognize excellence” (Nowotny, 
2014). 
The academic funding environment, likewise, is saturated with 
this discourse. A study of the National Endowment for the 
Humanities is entitled Excellence and Equity (Miller, 2015). The 
Wellcome Trust, a large medical funder, has grants for 
“sustaining excellence” (Sustaining Excellence Awards, 2016). 
The National Institutes of Health (NIH), the largest funder of 
civilian science in the United States, claims to fund “the best 
science by the best scientists” (Nicholson and Ioannidis, 2012) 
and regularly supports “centres of excellence”. The University 
Grants Commission of India recently awarded 15 institutions the 
title of “University with Potential for Excellence” (University 
Grants Commission, 2016). In the United Kingdom, the 
“Research Excellence Framework” uses expert assessment of 
“excellence” as a means of channelling differential funding to 
departments and institutions. In Australia, the national review 
framework is known as “Excellence in Research for Australia”. In  
Germany, the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft supports its 
“Clusters of Excellence” through a long standing “Excellence 
Initiative” (OECD, 2014). 
As this range of examples suggests, “excellence”, as used by 
universities and their funders, is a flexible term that operates in a 
variety of contexts across a range of registers. It can describe alike 
the activities of the world's top research universities and its 
smallest liberal arts colleges. It applies to their teaching, research, 
and management. It encompasses simultaneously the work of 
their Synthetic Biologists and Urban Sociologists, their Anglo-
Saxonists and Concert Pianists. It defines their Centres for 
Excellence in Teaching and their Centres of Excellence for 
Mechanical Systems Innovation (The University of Tokyo Global 
Center of Excellence, 2016; “USC Center for Excellence in 
Teaching”, 2016), their multiculturalism (Office of Excellence 
and Multicultural Student Success 2016) and their athletic 
training programmes (Excellence Academy, 2016). “Excellence” 
is used to define success in academic endeavour from Montreal to 
Mumbai. 
But what does “excellence” mean? Is there a single standard for 
identifying this apparently ubiquitous quality? Or is “excellence” 
defined on a discipline-by-discipline, or case-by-case basis? Can 
you know “excellence” before you see it? Or is it defined after the 
fact? Does the search for “excellence”, its use to reward and 
punish individual institutions and researchers, and its utility as a 
criterion for the organization of research help or hinder the actual 
production of that research and scholarship? Tertiary education 
enrols approximately 32% of world’s student age population, and 
OECD countries spent on average 1.6% of their GDP on 
University-level teaching and research in 2015; the United States 
alone spent 2.7% or US$484 billion (The Economist, 2015). Is 
“excellence” really the most efficient metric for distributing the 
resources available to the world’s scientists, teachers, and 
scholars? Does “excellence” live up to the expectations that 
academic communities place upon it? Is “excellence” excellent? 
And are we being excellent to each other in using it? 
This article examines the utility of “excellence” as a means for 
organizing, funding, and rewarding science and scholarship. It 
argues that academic research and teaching is not well served by 
this rhetoric. Nor, we argue, is it well served by the use of 
“excellence” to determine the distribution of resources and 
incentives to the world’s researchers, teachers and research 
institutions. While the rhetoric of “excellence” may seem in the 
current climate to be a natural method for determining 
which researchers, institutions, and projects should receive 
scarce resources, we demonstrate that it is not as efficient, 
accurate, or necessary as it may seem. As we show, indeed, a focus 
on “excellence” impedes rather than promotes scientific and 
scholarly activity: it at the same time discourages both the 
intellectual risk-taking required to make the most significant 
advances in paradigm-shifting research and the careful “Normal 
Science” (Kuhn [1962] 2012) that allows us to consolidate our 
knowledge in the wake of such advances. It encourages 
researchers to engage in counterproductive conscious and 
unconscious gamesmanship. And it impoverishes science and 
scholarship by encouraging concentration rather than distribu-
tion of effort. The net result is science and scholarship that is less 
reliable, less accurate, and less durable than research assessed 
according to other criteria. While we acknowledge that it often 
seems politically necessary to argue for “excellence”, and while we 
understand that funding and accreditation bodies and agencies 
must play a political as well as scientific game, we here present the 
evidence that the internalization of such rhetoric into the research 
space can be counter-productive. 
The article itself falls into three parts. In the first section, we 
discuss “excellence” as a rhetoric. Drawing on work by Michèle 
Lamont and others, we argue that “excellence” is less a 
discoverable quality than a linguistic interchange mechanism by 
which researchers compare heterogeneous sets of disciplinary 
practices. In the second section, we dig more deeply into the 
question of “excellence” as an assessment tool: we show how it 
distorts research practice while failing to provide a reliable means 
of distinguishing among competing projects, institutions, or 
people. In the final section, we consider what it might take to 
change our thinking on “excellence” and the scarcity it 
presupposes. We consider alternative narratives for approaching 
the assessment of research activity, practitioners, and institutions 
and discuss ways of changing the “scarcity-thinking” that has led 
us to our current use of this fungible and unreliable term. We 
propose that a narrative built on “soundness” and “capacity” 
offers us the opportunity to focus on practice of productive 
research and on the crucial role that social communication and 
criticism plays. Where there is more heterogeneity and greater 
opportunity for diversity of outcomes and perspectives, we argue, 
research improves. 
What is “excellence”? 
In her book, How Professors Think: Inside the Curious World of 
Academic Judgment, Michèle Lamont opens by noting that 
“ ‘excellence’ is the holy grail of academic life” (Lamont, 2009, 1). 
Yet, as she quickly moves to highlight, this “excellence is 
produced and defined in a multitude of sites and by an array of 
actors. It may look different when observed through the lenses of 
peer review, books that are read by generations of students, 
current articles published by ‘top’ journals, elections at national 
academies, or appointments at elite institutions” (3). Or as Jack 
Stilgoe suggests: “ ‘Excellence’ tells us nothing about how 
important the science is and everything about who decides” 
(Stilgoe, 2014). 
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This tallies with the work of others who have considered 
reforms to the review process in recent years. Kathleen 
Fitzpatrick, for instance, has also situated the crux of evaluation 
in the evaluator, not the evaluated. For, as Fitzpatrick notes, 
“in using a human filtering system, the most important thing 
to have information about is less the data that is being filtered, 
than the human filter itself: who is making the decisions, and 
why. Thus, in a peer-to-peer review system, the critical activity 
is not the review of the texts being published, but the review of 
the reviewers.” (Fitzpatrick, 2011, 38) 
The challenge here is that it is not possible to conduct a “review 
of the reviewers” without some reference to the evaluated 
material. It is possible to query the conduct of reviewers or the 
process they are (supposed to be) applying against another set of 
disciplinary norms (that is, are the reviewers acting in good faith? 
Have they provided a useful report? Do they know the field as 
normatively defined?); but to assess qualitative aspects of 
reviewers’ judgment of a specific work requires an external 
evaluation of the work itself—a type of circularity in which a pre-
shared evaluative culture must exist in order to pass judgment on 
the evaluation that is its basis: the “shared standards” of which 
Lamont writes (2009: 4). 
Yet despite the anti-foundational nature of this problem, there 
remains a pressing need, in Lamont’s view, to ensure that “peer 
review processes [... are] themselves subject to further evaluation” 
(247). Calls for training in peer review practices as well as calls for 
greater transparency occur across disciplinary boundaries, but 
generally without addressing the differences in practice that occur 
on either side of those boundaries. Lamont suggests that current 
remedies to this problem—which mostly consist of changing the 
degrees of anonymity or the point at which review is conducted 
(pre- versus post-filter)—are insufficient and constitute “imper-
fect safeguards”. Instead, she suggests, it is more important that 
members of peer-review communities should be educated “about 
how peer evaluation works,” avoiding the pitfalls of homophily 
(in which review processes merely re-inscribe value to work that 
exhibits similitude to pre-existing examples) by re-framing the 
debate as a “micro-political process of collective decision making” 
that is “genuinely social” (246–247). As with most problems in 
scholarly communication, the challenge with peer review is 
therefore not technical but social. 
As Lamont and others show, then, “excellence” is a pluralized 
construct that is specific to (and conservative within) each 
disciplinary environment. Yet even the most obvious solution to 
this challenge—interdisciplinary diversity of evaluators—only 
leads to further problems. For the differences in practice of 
review and perceptions of “excellence” across disciplinary 
boundaries, combined with a lack of appreciation that these 
differences exist, makes it difficult to reach consensus within such 
diverse pools of reviewers. This is because, as Stirling (2007b) has 
noted, “it is difficult indeed to contemplate any single general 
index of diversity that could aggregate properties [...] in a 
uniquely robust fashion”. If diversity itself cannot easily be 
collapsed onto a single measurable vector then there is little hope 
of aggregating diverse senses of “excellence” into a coherent and 
universal framework. 
This suggests that “excellence” resides between different 
communities and is ill-structured/defined in each context. Local 
groups and disciplines may have their own more specific (though 
sometimes conventional rather than explicit) measures of 
“excellence”: Biologists may treat some aspects of performance 
as “excellent” (for example, number of publications, author 
position, citations counts), while failing to recognize aspects 
considered equally or more “excellent” by English professors 
(large word counts, single authorship, publication or review in 
popular literary magazines and journals) (O’Donnell, 2015). 
Finally, as we will go on to show, it is clear that evaluative cultures 
are operating without even internal consensus beyond a few 
broad categories of performance. 
That said, it remains tempting to argue that such concepts of 
value, even if they are ungrounded and unshared, can be 
used pragmatically to foster consensus. This is the point of 
Wittgenstein’s (2001: section 293) famous “beetle in a box” 
metaphor, which he uses to exemplify the “private language 
argument”. For Wittgenstein, the question of unique non-
communicable epistemic knowledge (such as pain experience), 
should actually be framed in terms of public, pragmatic 
language games/contexts. If we each have an object in a box 
that is called a “beetle,” but none of us can see each other’s 
“beetles”, he argues, then the important thing is not what the 
objects in our boxes actually are but rather how we negotiate and 
use the term socially to engender intersubjective understanding or 
action. In such cases, “if we construe the grammar of the 
expression of sensation on the model of ‘object and designation’, 
the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant” and 
designation is all that matters. 
We might therefore productively ask: even if “excellence” is a 
concept that carries little or no information content, either within 
communities or across them, might it nonetheless be useful as a 
“beetle”? That is, as a carrier of interpretation or a set of social 
practices functioning as an expert system to convert intrinsic, 
qualitative, and non-communicable assessment into a form that 
allows performance to be compared across disciplinary or other 
boundaries? Might it, indeed, even be useful given the political 
necessity for research communities and institutions to present an 
(ostensibly) unified front to government and wider publics as a 
means of protecting their autonomy? Could “excellence” be, to 
speak bluntly, a linguistic signifier without any agreed upon 
referent whose value lies in an ability to capture cross-disciplinary 
value judgements and demonstrate the political desirability of 
public investment in research and research institutions? 
In actual practice, it is not even useful in this way. Although, as 
its ubiquity suggests, “excellence” is used across disciplines to 
assert value judgements about otherwise incomparable scientific 
and scholarly endeavours, the concept itself mostly fails to 
capture the disciplinary qualities it claims to define. Because it 
lacks content, “excellence” serves in the broadest sense solely as 
an (aspirational) claim of comparative success: that some thing, 
person, activity, or institution can be asserted in a hopefully 
convincing fashion to be “better” or “more important” than some 
other (often otherwise incomparable) thing, person, activity, or 
institution—and, crucially, that it is, as a result, more deserving of 
reward. But this emphasis on reward, as Kohn (1999) and others 
have demonstrated, is itself often poisonous to the actual qualities 
of the underlying activity. 
Is “excellence” good for research? 
Thus far, we have been arguing that “excellence” is primarily a 
rhetorical signalling device used to claim value across hetero-
geneous institutions, researchers, disciplines, and projects rather 
than a measure of intrinsic and objective worth. In some cases, 
the qualities of these projects can be compared in detail on other 
bases; in many—perhaps most—cases, they cannot. As we have 
argued, the claim that a research project, institution, or 
practitioner is “excellent” is little more than an assertion that 
that project, institution, or practitioner can be said to succeed 
better on its own terms than some other project, institution, or 
practitioner can be said to succeed on some other, usually largely 
incomparable, set of terms. 
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But what about these sets of “own terms”? How easy is it to 
define the “excellence” of a given project, institution, or 
practitioner on an intrinsic basis? Even if we leave aside the 
comparative aspect, are there formal criteria that can be used to 
identify “excellence” in a single research instance on its own terms 
or that of a single discipline? 
Research suggests that this is far harder than one might think. 
Academics, it turns out, appear to be particularly poor at 
recognizing a given instance of “excellence” when they see it, or, if 
they think they do, getting others to agree with them. Their 
continued willingness to debate relative quality in these terms, 
moreover, creates a basis for extreme competition that has serious 
negative consequences. 
Do researchers recognize excellence when they see it? The short 
answer is no. This can be seen most easily when different 
potential measures of “excellence” conflict in their assessment of a 
single paper, project, or individual. Adam Eyre-Walker and Nina 
Stoletzki, for example, conclude that scientists are poor at esti-
mating the merit and impact of scientific work even after it has 
been published (2013). Post-publication assessment is prone to 
error and biased by the journal in which the paper is published. 
Predictions of future impact as measured by citation counts are 
also generally unreliable, both because scientists are not good at 
assessing merit consistently across multiple metrics and because 
the accumulation of citations is itself a highly stochastic process, 
such that two papers of similar merit measured on other bases 
can accumulate very different numbers of citations just by chance. 
Moreover, Wang et al. (2016) show that in terms of citation 
metrics the most novel work is systematically undervalued over 
the time frames that conventional measures use, including, for 
instance, the Journal Impact Factor that Eyre-Walker and Sto-
letzki suggest biases expert assessment. 
This is true even of work that can be shown to be successful by 
other measures. Campanario, Gans and Shepherd, and others, for 
example, have traced the rejection histories of Nobel and other 
prize winners, including for papers reporting on results for which 
they later won their recognition (Gans and Shepherd, 1994; 
Campanario, 2009; Azoulay et al., 2011: 527–528). Campanario 
and others have also reported on the initial rejection of papers 
that later went on to become among the more highly cited in their 
fields or in the journals that ultimately accepted them 
(Campanario, 1993, 1996; Campanario, 1995; Campanario and 
Acedo, 2007; Calcagno et al., 2012; Nicholson and Ioannidis, 
2012; Siler et al., 2015). Yet others have found a generally poor 
relationship between high ratings in grant competitions and 
subsequent “productivity” as measured by publication or citation 
counts (Pagano, 2006; Costello, 2010; Lindner and Nakamura, 
2015; Fang et al., 2016; Meng, 2016). 
As this suggests, academics’ abilities to distinguish the 
“excellent” from the “not-excellent” do not correlate well with 
one another even within the same disciplinary environment 
(there tends to be greater agreement at the other end of the scale, 
distinguishing the “not acceptable” from the “acceptable,” see 
Cicchetti, 1991; Weller, 2001). To earn citations or win prizes for 
a rejected manuscript, after all, authors need to begin by 
convincing a different journal (and its referees) to accept work 
that others previously have found wanting. 
But this is not something that only Nobel prize winners are 
good at: as Weller reported in the early years of this century, most 
(51.4%) rejected manuscripts were ultimately published; in the 
vast majority of cases (approximately 90%), these previously 
rejected articles were accepted on their second submission and, in 
the vast majority of these cases (also approximately 90%), 
at a journal of similar prestige and circulation (Weller, 2001). 
While these statistics have almost certainly changed in the last 
few years with changes in the demographics of submission 
and, especially, the development of venues that focus on the 
publication of “sound science” (Public Library of Science, 2016), 
the basic sense that journal peer review is a gatekeeper that is 
frequently circumvented remains. 
Articles that are initially rejected and then go on to be 
published to great acclaim or even just in journals of a similar or 
higher ranking represent what are in essence false negatives in our 
ability to assess “excellence.” They are also evidence of terrible 
inefficiency. The rejection of papers that are subsequently 
published with little or no revision at journals of similar rank 
increases the costs for everyone involved without any counter-
vailing improvement in quality. In addition to multiplying the 
systemic cost of refereeing and editorial management by the 
number of resubmissions, such articles also present an opportu-
nity cost to their authors through lost chances to claim priority 
for discoveries, for example, or, even more commonly, lost 
opportunities for citation and influence (Gans and Shepherd, 
1994; Campanario, 2009; Şekercioğlu, 2013; Brembs, 2015; Psych 
Filedrawer, 2016). 
More worryingly, there is also considerable evidence of false 
positives in the review process—that is to say submissions that are 
judged to meet the standards of “excellence” required by one 
funding agency, journal, or institution, but do worse when 
measured against other or subsequent metrics. In a somewhat 
controversial work, Peters and Ceci submitted papers in slightly 
disguised form to journals that had previously accepted them for 
publication (Peters and Ceci, 1982; see Weller, 2001 for a 
critique). Only 8% overall of these resubmissions were explicitly 
detected by the editors or reviewers to which they were assigned. 
Of the resubmissions that were not explicitly detected, approxi-
mately 90% were ultimately rejected for methodological and/or 
other reasons by the same journals that had previously published 
them; they were rejected, in other words, for being insufficiently 
“excellent” by journals that had decided they were “excellent” 
enough to enter the literature previously. 
When it comes to funding, a similar pattern of false positives 
may pertain: a study by Nicholson and Ioannidis (2012) suggests 
that highly cited authors are less likely to head major biomedical 
research grants than less-frequently-cited but socially better-
connected authors who are associated with granting agency study 
groups and review panels. Fang, Bowen and Casadevall have 
discovered that “the percentile scores awarded by peer review 
panels” at the NIH correlated “poorly” with “productivity as 
measured by citations of grant-supported publications” (Fang 
et al., 2016). These suggest a bias towards conformance and social 
connectedness over innovation in funding decisions in a world in 
which success rates are as low as 10%. It also provides further 
evidence of funding-agency bias against disruptively innovative 
work noted by many researchers over the years (Kuhn [1962] 
2012; Campanario, 1993, 1995, 1996, 2009; Costello, 2010; 
Ioannidis et al., 2014; Siler et al., 2015). 
Fraud, error and lies. To the extent that the above are evidence 
of inefficiencies in the system, some might argue that individual 
problems in determining “excellence” in specific cases are 
resolved in the longer term and over large samples. Of course, 
these examples only show work for which multiple measures of 
“excellence” can be compared: given their unreliability, this sug-
gests that work that is not measured more than once may be 
unjustly suppressed or unjustly published, without us being able 
to tell the difference. On the other hand, it is presumably possible 
that even such extreme examples of differing perceptions of 
“excellence” represent honest differences of opinion as to the 
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qualitative merit of the research or researchers. The same cannot 
be said, however, of actual fraud and outright errors. 
As various studies have concluded, reported instances of both 
fraud and error (as measured through retractions) are on the rise 
(Claxton, 2005; Dobbs, 2006; Steen, 2011; Fang et al., 2012; 
Grieneisen and Zhang, 2012; Yong, 2012b; Chen et al., 2013; 
Andrade, 2016). This is particularly true at higher prestige 
journals (Resnik et al., 2015; Siler et al., 2015; Belluz, 2016). If we 
add to this list of (potentially) “false positives” studies that cannot 
be replicated, the number of papers that meet one measure of 
“excellence” (that is, passing peer review, often at “top” journals) 
while failing others (that is, being accurate and reproducible, and/ 
or non-fraudulent) rises considerably (Dean, 1989; Burman et al., 
2010; Lehrer, 2010; Bem, 2011; Goldacre, 2011; Yong, 2012b; 
Rehman, 2013; Resnik and Dinse, 2013; Hill and Pitt, 2014; 
Chang and Li, 2015; Open Science Collaboration, 2015). It is the 
very focus on “excellence”, however, that creates this situation: 
the desire to demonstrate the rhetorical quality of “excellence” 
encourages researchers to submit fraudulent, erroneous, and 
irreproducible papers, at the same time as it works to prevent the 
publication of reproduction studies that can identify such work. 
In other words, erroneous, and especially fraudulent or 
irreproducible papers are interesting because they represent a 
failure of both our ability to identify and predict actual qualitative 
“excellence” and the incentive system that is used to encourage 
scientists and scholars to produce the kind of sound and 
defensible work that should be a sine qua non for quality. As 
Fang, Steen, and Casadevall (2012; cf Steen, 2011 for which the 
later article represents a correction) have shown, the majority of 
retracted papers are withdrawn for reasons of misconduct 
including fraud, duplicate publication, or plagiarism (67.4%), 
rather than error (21.3%)—although inadvertent error should 
presumably itself be disqualification from “excellence”. But even 
these figures may under-represent the true incidence of 
misconduct. Mistakes and errors made in good faith are a natural 
and necessary part of the research process. Yet, as focus groups 
and surveys conducted by various researchers have demonstrated, 
some forms of error can be misconduct in the form of a (semi-) 
deliberate strategy for ensuring quick and/or numerous publica-
tions by “ ‘cutting a little corner’ in order to get a paper out before 
others or to get a larger grant,... [or] because... [a researcher] 
needed more publications that year” (Anderson et al., 2007: 457– 
458; see also Fanelli, 2009; Tijdink et al., 2014; Chubb and 
Watermeyer, 2016). 
Thus in one small sample of detailed surveys, Fanelli showed 
that while only a small percentage of scientists (1.97% pooled 
weighted average, n = 7) admitted to fabricating, falsifying, or 
modifying data, a much larger percentage claimed to have seen 
others engaging in similarly outright fraudulent activity (14.12%, 
n = 12). Furthermore, even larger percentages had engaged in 
(33.7%) or seen others engage in (72%) questionable research 
described using less negatively loaded language (Fanelli, 2009; the 
percentage of scientists admitting to explicit misconduct is 
considerably higher [15%] in Tijdink et al., 2014). As Fanelli 
concludes: “Considering that these surveys ask sensitive questions 
and have other limitations, it appears likely that this is a 
conservative estimate of the true prevalence of scientific 
misconduct” (2009, 9)—a conclusion very strongly supported 
by the anecdotal admissions of Anderson et al.’s focus groups. 
The drive for “excellence” in the eyes of assessors is shown even 
more starkly in work by Chubb and Watermeyer (2016). In 
structured interviews, academics in Australia and the United 
Kingdom admitted to outright lies in the claims of broader 
impacts made in research proposals. As the authors note: “Having 
to sensationalize and embellish impact claims was seen to have 
become a normalized and necessary, if regretful, aspect of 
academic culture and arguably par for the course in applying for 
competitive research funds” (6). Quoting an interviewee, they 
continue, “If you can find me a single academic who hasn’t had to 
bullshit or bluff or lie or embellish to get grants, then I will find 
you an academic who is in trouble with his [sic] Head of 
Department” (6; “[sic]” as in Chubb and Watermeyer). Here we 
see how a competitive requirement, perceived or real, for 
“excellence”, in combination with a lack of belief in the ability 
of assessors to detect false claims, leads to a conception of 
“excellence” as pure performance: a concept defined by what you 
can get away with claiming in order to suggest (rather than 
actually accomplish) “excellence”. 
What is striking about these behaviours, of course, is that they 
are unrelated to (and to a great extent perhaps even incompatible 
with or opposed to) the actual qualities funders, governments, 
journal editors and referees, and researchers themselves are 
ostensibly using “excellence” to identify. No agency, ministry, 
press, or research office intentionally uses “excellence” as 
shorthand for “able to embellish results or importance convin-
cingly”, even as the researchers being adjudicated under this 
system report such embellishment as a primary criterion for 
success. Whether it occurs through fraud, cutting corners, or 
exaggeration, this performance of “excellence” is commonly 
justified as being necessary for survival, suggesting a cognitive and 
cultural dissonance between those aspects of their work that the 
performers feel is essential and those aspects they feel they must 
emphasise, overstate, embellish, or fabricate to appear more 
“excellent” than their competitors. The evidence that fraud and 
corner-cutting are a problem at the core of the research process 
suggests that the pressure for these performances of “excellence” 
is not restricted to stages that do not matter. As Kohn argues, 
reward-motivation affects scientific creativity (the ability to 
“break out of the fixed pattern of behaviour that had succeeded 
in producing rewards… before”) as much as it does evidence-
gathering or the inflation of results (1999, 44; see also Lerner and 
Wulf, 2006; Azoulay et al., 2011; Tian and Wang, 2011). 
Competition for scarce resources and the performance of 
“excellence”. So why do researchers engage in this kind of 
dubious activity? Clearly for both Chubb and Watermeyer’s 
interviewees, as well as those identified as having committed 
scientific fraud, it is competition for scarce resources, whether 
funding, positions, or community prestige. Of course this is not a 
new issue (Smith, 2006). Taking time away from his work on the 
difference machine, Charles Babbage published an analysis of 
what he saw as the four main kinds of scientific frauds in an 1830 
polemic, Reflections on the Decline of Science in England: And on 
Some of Its Causes. These included the self-explanatory “hoaxing” 
and “forging,” in addition to “trimming” (“clipping off little bits 
here and there from those observations which differ most in 
excess from the mean and in sticking them on to those which are 
too small”) and “cooking” (“an art of various forms, the object of 
which is to give ordinary observations the appearance and 
character of those of the highest degree of accuracy”) (Babbage, 
1831: 178; see Zankl, 2003; and Secord, 2015 for a discussion). 
The motivation for these frauds, then as now, involves prestige 
and competition for resources. Babbage’s typology of fraudulent 
science was but a minor chapter in a book otherwise mostly 
concerned with the internal politics of the Royal Society. He 
attributed the decline he saw in English science to the lack of 
attention and professional opportunities available to potential 
scientists. He was, as a result, keenly sensitive to questions of 
credit and its importance in determining rank and authority. 
Indeed, as Casadevall and Fang remind us, “Since Newton, 
science has changed a great deal, but this basic fact has not. 
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Credit for work done is still the currency of science…. Since the 
earliest days of science, bragging rights to a discovery have gone 
to the person who first reports it” (Casadevall and Fang, 2012: 
13). The prestige of first discovery always has been a scarce 
resource. Now that that prestige is measured also through the 
scarce resource of authorship in “the right journals” and coupled 
ever more strongly to the further scarce resources of career 
advancement and grant funding, it should not be a surprise that 
the competition for those markers has become steadily stronger. 
The performance of “excellence” has become more marked 
as a result. 
If scandals such as fraudulent articles were the only way in 
which this overwhelming competitive focus on “excellence” hurt 
research, it would be bad enough. But the emphasis on rewarding 
the performance of “excellence” also has a more general impact 
on research capacity: it is the mechanism by which “the Matthew 
effect”—that is, the disproportionate accrual of resources to those 
researchers and institutions that are already well-rewarded— 
operates in a hyper-competitive research environment, creating 
distortions throughout the research cycle, even for work that is 
not fraudulent or the result of misconduct (Bishop, 2013; as its 
etymology implies, the “Matthew effect” predates today’s 
hypercompetition, see Merton, 1968, 1988)1: it increases the 
stakes of the competition for resources and, as a result, 
encourages gamesmanship; creates a bias towards (non-
disruptively) novel, positive, and even inflated results on the 
part of authors and editors; and discourages the pursuit and 
publication of types of “Normal Science” (such as replication 
studies) that are crucial to the viability of the research enterprise, 
without being glamorous enough to suggest that their authors are 
“excellent”. 
Positive bias and the decline effect. Just how destructive this 
need to perform “excellence” is can be illustrated by the well-
known bias towards positive results in scientific publication (for 
example, Dickersin et al., 1987, 2005; Sterling, 1959; Kennedy, 
2004; Young and Bang, 2004; Bertamini and Munafò, 2012; 
Rothstein, 2014; Psych Filedrawer, 2016). Thus, for example, 
Fanelli (2011) demonstrated a 22% growth between 1990 and 
2007 in the “frequency of papers that, having declared to have 
‘tested’ a hypothesis, reported a positive support for it”. This is all 
the more remarkable given that the late 1980s were themselves 
not a halcyon period of unbiased science: in an 1987 study of 271 
unpublished and 1041 published trials, Dickersin et al. found that 
14% of unpublished and 55% of published trials favoured the 
experimental therapy (1987). As Young et al. suggest, “the general 
paucity in the literature of negative data” is such that “[i]n some 
fields, almost all published studies show formally significant 
results so that statistical significance no longer appears dis-
criminating” (2008, 1419). 
Another artifact of this positive bias is the “decline effect,” or 
the tendency for the strength of evidence for a particular finding 
to decline over time from that stated on its first publication 
(Schooler, 2011; Gonon et al., 2012; Brembs et al., 2013; Groppe, 
2015; Open Science Collaboration, 2015). While this effect is also 
well-known, Brembs et al. have recently shown that its presence is 
significantly positively correlated with journal prestige as 
measured by Impact Factor: early papers appearing in high 
prestige journals report larger effects than subsequent studies 
using smaller samples (2013, see Figs. 1b and 1c in this reference). 
The bias against replication. Finally, there is a bias against the 
publication of replication studies in disciplines where such pat-
terns make scientific sense. Indeed, there are currently insufficient 
structural incentives to perform work that “merely” revalidates 
existing studies, fuelled by a focus on novelty in most definitions 
of “excellence”. As Nosek et al. note 
Publishing norms emphasize novel, positive results. As such, 
disciplinary incentives encourage design, analysis, and report-
ing decisions that elicit positive results and ignore negative 
results. Prior reports demonstrate how these incentives inflate 
the rate of false effects in published science. When incentives 
favour novelty over replication, false results persist in the 
literature unchallenged, reducing efficiency in knowledge 
accumulation. (2012) 
This bias against replication is even more remarkable, however, 
when it involves studies that invalidate rather than confirm the 
original result, especially when the original result has a high 
profile or is potentially field-defining—qualities that one would 
assume would increase the novelty and interest of the (non) 
replication itself (Goldacre, 2011; Wilson, 2011; Nosek et al., 
2012; Yong, 2012a, b; Aldhous, 2011; for a view from the other 
side of replication, see Bissell, 2013). This is in part, a function of 
publishing economics: commercial journals earn money from 
subscription, access, and reprint fees (Lundh et al., 2010); high 
profile results and a high prestige reflected by a high Impact 
Factor help maintain the demand for these journals and hence 
ensure both a continuing stream of interesting new material and a 
steady or rising income for the journal as a whole (Lawrence, 
2007; Munafò et al., 2009; Lundh et al., 2010; Marcovitch, 2010). 
Undercutting (or perhaps even qualifying) the high-profile results 
that help bring in these subscribers, new articles, and attention 
attacks the very foundation of this success—a journal that 
publishes high profile but incorrect papers is undercutting its case 
for subscription and author submissions. One doesn’t need to 
imagine a conspiracy to promote poor science to understand how 
a conscious or unconscious bias against replication studies might 
arise under such circumstances. 
The reluctance of major journals to publish replication studies 
embeds this bias in the incentive system that guides authors. As 
Wilson notes: 
[M]ajor journals simply won't publish replications. This is a real 
problem: in this age of Research Excellence Frameworks and 
other assessments, the pressure is on people to publish in high 
impact journals. Careful replication of controversial results is 
therefore good science but bad research strategy under these 
pressures, so these replications are unlikely to ever get run. Even 
when they do get run, they don't get published, further reducing 
the incentive to run these studies next time. The field is left with 
a series  of  “exciting” results dangling in mid-air, connected only 
to other studies run in the same lab. (2011) 
As Rothstein (2014) argues “The consequences of this problem 
include the danger that readers and reviewers will reach the 
wrong conclusion about what the evidence shows, leading at 
times to the use of unsafe or ineffective treatments”. 
Homophily. Thus far, we have been discussing the negative 
impact of “excellence” largely in terms of its effect on the practice 
and results of professional researchers. There is, however, another 
effect of the drive for “excellence”: a restriction in the range of 
scholars, of the research and scholarship performed by such 
scholars, and the impact such research and scholarship has on the 
larger population. Although “excellence” is commonly presented 
as the most fair or efficient way to distribute scarce resources 
(Sewitz, 2014), it in fact can have an impoverishing effect on the 
very practices that it seeks to encourage. A funding programme 
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that looks to improve a nation’s research capacity by differentially 
rewarding “excellence” can have the paradoxical effect of redu-
cing this capacity by underfunding the very forms of “normal” 
work that make science function (Kuhn [1962] 2012) or distract 
attention from national priorities and well-conducted research 
towards a focus on performance measures of North America and 
Europe (Vessuri et al., 2014). A programme that seeks to reward 
Humanists, similarly, by focussing on output in “high impact” 
academic journals paradoxically reduces the impact of these same 
disciplines by encouraging researchers to focus on their profes-
sional peers rather than broader cultural audiences (Readings, 
1996), reducing the domain’s relevance even as its performance of 
“excellence” improves. A programme of concentration on the 
“best” academics, in other words, can have the effect of focussing 
attention on problems and approaches in which “excellence” can 
be performed most easily rather than those that could benefit the 
most (or provide the greatest actual impact) from increased 
attention. 
Moreover, a concentration on the performance of “excellence” 
can promote homophily among the scientists themselves. Given 
the strong evidence that there is systemic bias within the 
institutions of research against women, under-represented ethnic 
groups, non-traditional centres of scholarship, and other 
disadvantaged groups (for a forthright admission of this bias 
with regard to non-traditional centres of scholarship, see 
Goodrich, 1945), it follows that an emphasis on the performance 
of “excellence”—or, in other words, being able to convince 
colleagues that one is even more deserving of reward than others 
in the same field—will create even stronger pressure to conform 
to unexamined biases and norms within the disciplinary culture: 
challenging expectations as to what it means to be a scientist is a 
very difficult way of demonstrating that you are the “best” at 
science; it is much easier if your appearance, work patterns, and 
research goals conform to those of which your adjudicators have 
previous experience. In a culture of “excellence” the quality of 
work from those who do not work in the expected “normative” 
fashion run a serious risk of being under-estimated and 
unrecognised (King et al., 2014, 2016; O’Connor and O’Hagan, 
2015; University of Arizona Commission on the Status of 
Women, 2015; this is, in part, an explanation for the systemically 
underreported and poorly acknowledged and rewarded work of 
women “assistants” in many of the great scientific discoveries of 
the twentieth century). There is a clear case to answer that, absent 
substantial corrective measures and awareness, a focus on 
“excellence” will continue to maintain rather than work to 
overcome social barriers to participation in research by currently 
underrepresented groups. 
Homophily is in some senses a variant on Merton’s “Matthew 
effect,” discussed above. It is also a variant on the old argument 
that existing power structures—those populated by those whom it 
is assumed already exemplify “excellence”—tend towards con-
servatism in their processes of evaluation. It underpins the calls to 
reassess the focus of mainstream scholarship, whether this is 
“great men” history, the “Dead White Male” in literary “canon”, 
or the bias towards the ills of the western male patient in medical 
research. As Barbara Herrnstein Smith says with respect to 
literary evaluation: 
…[a work that “endures”] will also also begin to perform 
certain characteristic cultural functions by virtue of the very 
fact that it has endured...In these ways, the canonical work 
begins increasingly not merely to survive within but to shape 
and create the culture in which its value is produced and 
transmitted and, for that very reason, to perpetuate the 
conditions of its own flourishing. (Herrnstein Smith, 1988 
emphasis in the original) 
In other words, the works that—and the people who—are 
considered “excellent” will always be evaluated, like the canon 
that shapes the culture that transmits it, on a conservative basis: 
past performance by preferred groups helps establish the norms 
by which future performances of “excellence” are evaluated. 
Whether it is viewed as a question of power and justice or simply 
as an issue of lost opportunities for diversity in the cultural co-
production of knowledge, an emphasis on the performance of 
“excellence” as the criterion for the distribution of resources and 
opportunity will always be backwards looking, the product of an 
evaluative process by institutions and individuals that is 
established by those who came before and resists disruptive 
innovation in terms of people as much as ideas or process. 
Alternative narratives: working for change 
If, as we have argued, “excellence” in all its many forms and 
meanings is both unreliable as a measure of actual quality, and 
pernicious in the way it promotes poor behaviour and 
discourages good, what then are the alternatives? Given the 
political realities that have promoted the use of this rhetoric in 
defence of science and scholarship, are there other, less damaging 
ways in which we can evaluate and promote the value of research 
and its communication? 
Because “excellence” is used so ubiquituously across the 
research space, a complete answer to this question is far beyond 
the scope of any single paper: there is no single alternative that 
can replace the rhetoric of “excellence” in scholarly publishing, 
research funding, government and university policy, public 
relations, and promotion and tenure practices. In some areas, 
moreover, technological and economic changes suggest fairly 
obvious directions in which progress is being made—a prime 
example being the change from the physical scarcity that 
characterized print journals, adjudication to the abundance that, 
technically at least, characterizes a web-based publication 
infrastructure (for well-known discussions of this, see Shirky, 
2010; Nielsen, 2012). 
In many ways, however, the greatest challenge is research 
funding and infrastructure. The continuing competition for 
government and private funds raises questions of prioritization 
and adjudication that are unlikely to be rapidly answered by 
changes in technology or attitudes. A central test of our critique 
of rhetorics of “excellence” is therefore to ask whether there are 
any alternatives in this arena. Since funding applications tend to 
collect examples of “excellence” from other aspects of the research 
enterprise as a form of justification (success in funding is a 
function of one's ability to demonstrate “excellence” in different 
types of performance), it also represents the apex of the problem. 
Perhaps because it is so hard, the tendency in policy, at least in 
the traditional North Atlantic centres of research in the last 
several decades, has clearly been in a non-distributive direction: 
for the concentration of resources on “top” institutions (in earlier 
periods, such as the early space race, for example, the focus was 
arguably more distributive). The Research Excellence Framework 
in the United Kingdom (REF) and massive new research centres 
such as the Crick in London are intended to create a “critical 
mass” of “excellent” or “world-leading” research. In Canada, 
which is an outlier internationally in the push towards 
stratification (Usher, 2016), it remains the case that the “top” 
universities (which have their own independent lobby group), 
receive a disproportionate share of research resources when 
measured, for example, against the percentage of students 
(including Doctoral students) they educate (U15 Group of 
Canadian Research Universities/Regroupement des universités 
de recherche du Canada, 2016). In the much larger U.S. post 
secondary system, ten universities received nearly 20% of all 
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government research funds; as Weigley and Hess note, while 
these universities are among the richest in the country in terms of 
their endowments, public funding still constitutes the largest part 
of their R&D funding (2013). 
Many have questioned the value of such an inequitable 
distribution of funds when a less concentrated, or less unequal, 
distribution could achieve greater outcomes. Dorothy Bishop 
argues, with respect to the REF that there should be less of a 
disparity between rewarding research that is perceived to be “the 
best” and that which is perceived as merely average. Instead, 
Bishop (2013) argues, all research submitted to the REF should 
receive some funding and the perceived best research should 
receive a smaller overall proportionate gain. This would have the 
benefit of decreasing the funding gulf between elite and middle-
tier universities and would encourage diversity in the process. Of 
course such an approach may be politically troublesome for the 
academy, as long as the criterion it promotes is relative 
“excellence” rather than, say, “capacity”, “breadth”, “soundness”, 
“comprehensiveness” or “accessibility”. If funding is allocated on 
a scattered basis, following the logic that predictive approaches to 
quality are weak at best, then the authority claims of the 
university are substantially devalued as long as the rhetoric 
used to defend them privileges a “winner-take-all” measure of 
effectiveness. 
There is, however, a compelling case to be made for the value 
of greater redistribution of research funding. Cook et al. (2015) 
showed that for UK Bioscience groups an optimal allocation of 
fixed resources would involve spreading the money between a 
larger number of smaller groups. This was the case whether 
number of publications or number of citations were used as the 
measure of productivity. A similar conclusion is reached by 
Fortin and Currie who argue that scientific impact is only “weakly 
money-limited” and that a more productive strategy would be to 
distribute funds based on “diversity” rather than perceptions of 
“excellence” (Fortin and Currie, 2013). Gordon and Poulin 
argued that, for science funding in Canada through the National 
Science and Engineering Research Council (NSERC, the main 
STEM funding agency), it would have cost less at a whole system 
level simply to distribute the average award to all eligible 
applicants than to incur the costs associated with preparing, 
reviewing and selecting proposals (2009; although see Roorda, 
2009 for a critique of their calculation). A rough calculation of the 
system costs of preparing failed grant applications would suggest 
that they are in the same order of magnitude as research grant 
funding itself (Herbert et al., 2013). 
What this suggests is that “excellence” is not the only policy 
choice concerning the resourcing of research, nor even, 
necessarily, the only politically compelling one: from concentrat-
ing resources on the most deserving, allegedly “excellent”, 
institutions and researchers, to distributing them amongst all 
those that meet some minimum criteria—or even some subset, by 
lottery (Health Research Council of New Zealand, 2016; Fang 
et al., 2016), arguments can be made for a variety of different 
methods of funding research. In the context of scarce resources 
and a desire to maximize outcomes, indeed, there is even an 
argument for focussing most attention on the worst institutions; 
those that might most benefit from resources to improve (Bishop, 
2013), have the greatest scope for improvement, and would go the 
longest way to ensuring an increase in basic capacity. In this case, 
rather than “excellence” appraisers would be looking for some 
sort of baseline level of qualification, “credibility” (Morgan, 2016), 
perhaps, or “soundness”. This would be a shift from focussing on 
evaluation of outputs to an evaluation of practice. 
The challenge with any redistributive scheme is how to engage 
with politics. While proposing interesting and valuable thought 
experiments, they do not address the needs of working with 
governments who need to account for the distribution of public 
funds and may fear the optics of a system built on criteria other 
than “the best”. The narrative and the need for “excellence” (like 
that of “international competitiveness”) is important as a shared 
language of externally recognizable symbols that justify funding 
to government and to wider publics. 
As noted earlier, this serves the interests of those who have 
already “earned” the label. The local construction of “excellence” 
is inherently conservative, and maintaining its structures serves 
the interests of those who hold local power. Therefore, narratives 
arguing for redistribution need to be more than just interesting 
ideas and more than simply factually correct. They need to be 
politically as well as intellectually compelling. 
Soundness and capacity over “excellence”. This is where a 
rhetoric built around “soundness” and “capacity” offers oppor-
tunities. The idea that “sound research is good research”, and 
“more research is better than less”—that our focus should be on 
thoroughness, completeness, and appropriate standards of 
description, evidence, and probity rather than flashy claims of 
superiority—presents an alternative to the existing notions of 
“excellence”. Such a narrative also addresses deeper concerns 
regarding a breakdown in research culture through hypercom-
petition. These terms resonate with public and funder concerns 
for value, and they align with the need for improved commu-
nications and wider engagement encouraged by many govern-
ments and agencies. 
It might be argued in the case of “soundness” in particular that 
the term is as subjective as “excellence”. Stirling (2007a) has 
argued that the implication that expert analysis can be free from 
subjective values in determining something like “soundness” is 
itself misleading and exclusionary. Certainly “soundness” or 
“scientificness” rhetorics have been used to give credibility to 
controversial technologies and to shut a range of perspectives out 
of public discourse in ways that are similar to uses of “excellence” 
we have criticized. 
But the evaluation of “soundness” is based in the practice of 
scholarship, whereas “excellence” is a characteristic of its objects 
(outputs and actors). In this sense “soundness” aligns well with 
approaches that locate the value of scholarship and evaluation in 
the nature of its processes (that is, “proper practice”) and its 
social conduct. While disagreeing on what the outputs of research 
can actually mean, scholars from Fleck, through Merton, Kuhn, 
Ravetz and Latour have all focussed on how practice in a social 
context in which norms and ethics are sustained and enforced 
leads to productive scholarship (Fleck [1935] 1979; Ravetz, 1973; 
Latour and Woolgar, 1986; Latour, 1987). “Soundness” can be 
assessed by how it supports socially developed and documentable 
processes and norms. In contrast assessment of “excellence” 
depends on how convincing the performance of importance and 
impact is. Like “excellence” the criteria for “soundness” are 
not universal qualities distinct from pre-existing socially devel-
oped practice; but in contrast to “excellence”, the qualities of 
“soundness” can be benchmarked. They are also more precise: 
“excellence” in the senses we are discussing is used describe the 
competitive position of an entire performance in relation to 
others; “soundness” focusses on details: statistical or bibliographic 
appropriateness, say, or well-chosen evidence. 
Another question about “soundness” involves its cross-
disciplinary application. What is “soundness” in the context of 
the Humanities? Eve (2014, 144) has suggested that “soundness” 
in a humanities paper might involve the ability to “evince an 
argument; make reference to the appropriate range of extant 
scholarly literature; be written in good, standard prose of an 
appropriate register that demonstrates a coherence of form and 
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content; show a good awareness of the field within which it was 
situated; pre-empt criticisms of its own methodology or 
argument; and be logically consistent”. More recently, Morgan 
(2016) has suggested that “credibility” may be the humanities 
equivalent of “soundness”. Others have focussed on the term 
“quality” in the sense in which it used in quality assurance 
(Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1990; Funtowicz and Ravetz, 2003), as 
fitness for an explicitly defined purpose. As we have argued above 
all of these appear to capture the sense that productive 
scholarship can be defined by allegiance to socially defined 
research practice as much as performance of success. 
Our argument here is not that expanding our boundary for 
resourcing from “excellence” to “soundness” and “capacity” is all 
that is necessary to change research culture and improve the 
distribution of resources; rather, it is that a move from resourcing 
based on the performance of an ineluctable quality to one based 
on the demonstration of documentable, socially developed 
practice, is the first step to solving the problems our rhetoric of 
“excellence” has created. Soundness appears be a plausible basis 
on which to build a new narrative, or rather to combine existing 
threads into a more consistent rhetorical framework. Such a 
framework will work to refocus our attention on research that is 
sufficiently valuable to be worth pursuing. To drive adoption and 
practice towards making this real, however, will require more 
than narrative. It will need resources to be redistributed towards 
supporting a broader class of research activities. 
Do soundness and capacity sell? Although we have been 
focussing on funding, the rhetoric of soundness and capacity, 
about the idea that the most important quality of research is that 
it be done and done with care, does resonate with other aspects of 
the research enterprise. 
Some examples of this are the broad area of reproducibility 
(Burman et al., 2010; Lehrer, 2010; Goldacre, 2011; Yong, 2012b; 
Rehman, 2013; Chang and Li, 2015; Open Science Collaboration, 
2015), reporting guidelines for animal experiments (Kilkenny 
et al., 2010) and clinical trials (Schulz et al., 2010), and work on 
registered replication studies in social psychology (Simons et al., 
2014). All have been areas of substantial professional and popular 
discussion and the emphasis on the need for clarity of description 
and “doing things properly” is consistent. The idea that research 
must be reproducible, safe, and complete can be at least as 
compelling an argument as that it must be simply excellent. 
Another place where the rhetoric of “soundness” and 
“capacity” has booked considerable success is the online journal 
PLOS ONE and the journals that have since begun to follow its 
approach.2 PLOS ONE was launched with the stated aim of 
publishing any scientific research that was deemed technically 
sound, regardless of its perceived novelty or impact. This 
approach was made possible by two developments in academic 
publishing—the move to fully online publications without the 
need for print editions, and the growing acceptance of Article 
Processing Charge (APC)-funded Open Access as a viable 
publication model. These enabled the journal to consider and 
publish any manuscript that met its criteria, with no limitations 
on page space or fixed subscription revenue. As a result, the 
journal grew very quickly, becoming the largest journal in the 
world within 5 years of launching (MacCallum, 2011). 
The PLOS ONE model has been widely emulated, with almost 
every major scientific publisher now offering a journal with 
similar editorial criteria. This has created a competitive landscape 
with interesting properties. Traditional journals compete by 
seeking to publish the most “excellent” papers that they can 
attract and demonstrate this by the number of papers they reject. 
This also leads authors to self-select for submission to those 
journals only the papers they consider most important–avoiding, 
for example, “wasting” anybody’s time by submitting “non-
original” work such as replication studies. Over time, success in 
this venture, its own form of hypercompetition, leads to a 
differentiated set of ranked journals driven by their own 
performative targets, or aspirations to join the top ranks. Authors 
and editors engage in a cycle of performance that reduces the 
breadth of research journals are willing to publish and authors 
willing to submit. 
PLOS ONE and its competitors also compete, but on quite 
different terms and in ways that arguably improve rather than 
imperil the research enterprise. Speed of publication, for example, 
always features in author surveys, and journals like PLOS ONE 
often advertise their average turnaround times. They even 
compete on the basis of journal prestige, reputation and Impact 
Factor (Solomon, 2014), albeit with a heavier emphasis on 
soundness and number of publications (that is, capacity) rather 
than exclusivity and “excellence”. Even when the criteria for 
inclusion is only soundness, membership in the club of authors 
still provides a prestige benefit: that the doors of the club are more 
open does not necessarily mean that there is no benefit to  
membership (Potts et al., 2016). 
But PLOS ONE and similar journals also demonstrate that it is 
not simply enough to create mechanisms that test for soundness 
and capacity. Even when offered a distributive narrative, 
researchers often still find it difficult to avoid the concentrating 
rhetoric of “excellence”. A common complaint from the managers 
of journals such as PLOS ONE, indeed, is that their journals’ 
referees, who are usually made up of previous authors, often seek 
to reject papers that they feel do not meet their own perceptions 
of “excellence,” instead of focussing on the journal’s formal 
criterion of “soundness”. Many anecdotes from PLOS ONE 
authors, likewise, involve being surprised by how tough the 
refereeing process was for their articles—a response that signals 
relative “excellence” that might otherwise not be apparent to the 
reader (see especially Curry, 2012 and comments). The 
performance of “excellence”, the signalling of relative superiority 
through an additional line on the CV, is still more important 
from a career perspective than the science itself: nobody gets 
tenure for publishing to arXiv, no matter how good the quality of 
their research. At least that appears to be what most tenure-track 
academics believe. And while reader attention or online 
conversation are gaining some currency as indicators of qualities 
valued in an article, the current discourse indicates that authors 
need to feel that they have cleared a higher bar than they in 
fact have. 
In other words, initiatives like PLOS ONE will have truly 
succeeded in changing researchers’ own bias towards (ultimately 
undemonstrable) “excellence” only when their rejection rate is 
seen to be less important than the evidence that controls are in 
place to ensure and encourage the recognition of “soundness”. 
Caveats and further work 
The potential scope of the project of this article is huge, and we 
have only been able to touch on some of its aspects. We have 
focused on narratives and rhetoric and sought to bring evidence 
of how existing rhetorics are damaging. What we have not done, 
as a variety of both anonymous reviewers and non-anonymous 
commenters have noted, is address the power politics that 
underlie many of the structures that we are critiquing. Nor have 
we analysed the degree to which different actors within the 
system are able to enact change. 
Understanding how the changes we propose in narrative 
and indeed culture can be achieved politically and institutionally 
is a much larger project, one on which others are already engaged 
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and one that is critically important in the current political 
climate. Institutional change is challenging and slow. We hope 
that alongside the criticism, implicit and explicit of some 
existing institutions, we have offered some routes forward to be 
investigated and explored. 
We have also not undertaken a historical analysis. While we 
draw on literature from a range of periods we have not 
addressed how and when our current narratives developed. 
While we would argue that it has deep roots, we have neither the 
expertise nor the space to probe the history through which 
excellence rhetorics became institutionalized in their current 
forms. The differing registers and locations of excellence rhetorics 
over time—policing access to the right clubs, publication in the 
right journals, career success and contributions to institutional 
funding—is deserving of further study and would additionally 
strengthen the political analysis. 
Closing the loop: planning for cultural change 
In this article, we have advanced an argument that “excellence” is 
not just unhelpful to realising the goals of research and research 
communities but actively pernicious. A narrative of scarcity 
combined with “excellence” as an interchange mechanism leads 
to concentration of resources and thence hypercompetition. 
Hypercompetition in turn leads to greater (we might even say 
more shameless, see Anderson et al., 2007; Fanelli, 2009; Tijdink 
et al., 2014; Chubb and Watermeyer, 2016) attempts to perform 
this “excellence”, driving a circular conservatism and reification 
of existing power structures while harming rather than improving 
the qualities of the underlying activity. 
We have also argued that, while many commentaries reviewed 
throughout this piece lay the blame for this at the feet of external 
actors—institutional administrators captured by neo-liberal 
ideologies, funders over-focussed on delivering measurable 
returns rather than positive change, governments obsessed with 
economic growth at the cost of social or community value—the 
roots of the problem in fact lie in the internal narratives of the 
academy and the nature of “excellence” and “quality” as 
supposedly shared concepts that researchers have developed into 
shields of their autonomy. The solution to such problems lies not 
in arguing for more resources for distribution via existing 
channels as this will simply lead to further concentration and 
hypercompetition. Instead, we have argued, these internal 
narratives of the academy must be reformulated. 
Finally, we have argued for a more pluralistic approach to the 
distribution of resources and credit. Where competition does take 
place it should do so on the basis of the many different qualities, 
plural, that are important to different communities using and 
creating research. But it should also be recognized that 
competition is not, in this context, an unalloyed good. In the 
context of assessing the risks of application of research Stirling 
and others argue for “broadening out and opening up” the 
technology assessment process (Ely et al., 2014, see also Stilgoe, 
2014), that is to say increasing both the set of criteria considered 
and the range of people who have a voice in its assessment and 
application. The same approach needs to be applied to research 
assessment itself. 
This leads to our argument for a focus on redistribution instead 
of concentration, which, we suggest, is necessary for three core 
reasons. Firstly because “excellence” cannot be recognized or 
defined consensually, except as a Wittgensteinian “beetle in a 
box” that no-one has ever seen, and even then, unlike 
Wittgenstein’s beetle-owners, by researchers who cannot agree 
even within disciplinary communities on which aspects of 
“excellence” might matter or be useful. Second because, as we 
have argued, there is a case to be made for redistribution on its 
own merits. Unlike concentration, and the hypercompetition to 
which it leads, which break down our standards and cultures 
in systematic, predictable, and negative ways, redistribution 
enhances capacity and breadth of participation. And thirdly, we 
have shown that top-loading of research funding based upon 
anti-foundational principles of “excellence” is likely to hurt the 
incremental advances upon which research implicitly relies. 
The argument for redistribution is a challenging one to 
advance. The rhetorics of scarcity, of concentration and 
competition are linked to strong cultural and economic 
narratives, particularly in the United Kingdom and United States. 
But as a route towards this goal we have argued that it is possible 
to build upon existing narratives of “soundness”, “credibility” and 
“capacity”—which is to say on narratives of reproducibility, 
transparency, high-quality reporting, and a breadth and diversity 
of activity—to build a case for strong cultural practices that focus 
on fundamental standards that define proper scholarly and 
scientific practice. This focus on the practice of research, 
including its communications, rather than the performance of 
success at research can also be aligned with developing narratives 
of Responsible Research and Innovation and public engagement. 
For instance the approach of Post-Normal Science advocated by 
Funtowicz and Ravetz (2003; 1990), focuses on assessing the 
quality of the process of research practice, and emphasises the 
need to effectively communicate the weaknesses of any claims 
made on the basis of research. 
In taking this approach we root the discourse in long-standing 
traditions and culture, while also engaging with the newer 
concerns. It is through showing that we can recognize sound and 
credible research and that we can build strong cultures and 
communities around that recognition, that we lay the ground-
work for making the case for redistribution. And that would be 
excellent. 
Notes 
1 The name of the Matthew Effect is derived from Matthew 13:12: “For whosoever hath, 
to him shall be given, and he shall have more abundance: but whosoever hath not, 
from him shall be taken away even that he hath”. 
2 As noted in the disclosure of competing interests, three of the authors of this article 
have worked for PLOS previously. 
References 
Aldhous P (2011) Journal Rejects Studies Contradicting Precognition. New 
Scientist, 11 May, https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn20447-journal-
rejects-studies-contradicting-precognition/, accessed 19 February. 
Alpher RA, Bethe H and Gamow G (1948) The origin of chemical elements. 
Physical Review; 73 (7): 803–804. 
Anderson MS, Ronning EA, De Vries R and Martinson BC (2007) The perverse 
effects of competition on scientists’ work and relationships. Science and 
Engineering Ethics; 13 (4): 437–461. 
Andrade R de O (2016) Sharp Rise in Scientific Paper Retractions. University 
World News, 8 January http://www.universityworldnews.com/article.php? 
story = 20160108194308816. 
Azoulay P, Zivin JSG and Manso G (2011) Incentives and creativity: Evidence from 
the academic life sciences. The Rand Journal of Economics; 42 (3): 527–554. 
Babbage C (1831) Reflections on the Decline of Science in England: And on Some 
of Its Causes, by Charles Babbage (1830). To Which Is Added On the Alleged 
Decline of Science in England, by a Foreigner (Gerard Moll) with a Foreword by 
Michael Faraday (1831). B. Fellowes: London. 
Belluz J (2016) Do ‘Top’ Journals Attract ‘Too Good to Be True’ Results? Vox. 11  
January, http://www.vox.com/2016/1/11/10749636/science-journals-fraud-
retractions. 
Bem D (2011) Feeling the future: Experimental evidence for anomalous retroactive 
influences on cognition and affect. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology; 
100 (3): 407–425. 
Bertamini M and Munafò MR (2012) Bite-size science and its undesired side 
effects. Perspectives on Psychological Science: A Journal of the Association for 
Psychological Science; 7 (1): 67–71. 
PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS | 3:16105 | DOI: 10.1057/palcomms.2016.105 | www.palgrave-journals.com/palcomms 10 
PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS | DOI: 10.1057/palcomms.2016.105 ARTICLE 
Bishop D (2013) The Matthew Effect and REF2014. BishopBlog, http://deevybee. 
blogspot.ca/2013/10/the-matthew-effect-and-ref2014.html, accessed 15 Octo-
ber. 
Bissell M (2013) Reproducibility: The risks of the replication drive. Nature; 503 
(7476): 333–334. 
Brembs B (2015) The cost of the rejection-resubmission cycle. The Winnower. 
doi:10.15200/winn.142497.72083. 
Brembs B, Button K and Munafò M (2013) Deep impact: Unintended 
consequences of journal rank. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience; 7, 291. 
Burman LE, Reed WR and Alm J (2010) A call for replication studies. Public 
Finance Review; 38 (6): 787–793. 
Calcagno V, Demoinet E, Gollner K, Guidi L, Ruths D and de Mazancourt C (2012) 
Flows of research manuscripts among scientific journals reveal hidden 
submission patterns. Science; 338 (6110): 1065–1069. 
Campanario JM (1993) Consolation for the scientist: Sometimes it is hard to 
publish papers that are later highly cited. Social Studies of Science; 23, 342–362. 
Campanario JM (1995) Commentary on influential books and journal articles 
initially rejected because of negative referees’ evaluations. Science Communica-
tion; 16 (3): 304–325. 
Campanario JM (1996) Have referees rejected some of the most-cited articles of 
all times? Journal of the American Society for Information Science; 47 (4): 302–310. 
Campanario JM (2009) Rejecting and resisting Nobel class discoveries: Accounts by 
Nobel Laureates. Scientometrics; 81 (2): 549–565. 
Campanario JM and Acedo E (2007) Rejecting highly cited papers: The views of 
scientists who encounter resistance to their discoveries from other scientists. 
Journal of the American Society for Information Science and Technology; 58, 
734–743. 
Casadevall A and Fang FC (2012) Winner takes all. Scientific American; 307 (2): 13. 
Chang AC and Li P (2015) Is Economics Research Replicable? Sixty Published 
Papers from Thirteen Journals Say ‘Usually Not.’ 2015-083. Finance and 
Economics Discussion Series. Washington DC: Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System. http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/feds/2015/ 
files/2015083pap.pdf. 
Chen C, Hu Z, Milbank J and Schultz T (2013) A visual analytic study of retracted 
articles in scientific literature. Journal of the American Society for Information 
Science and Technology; 64 (2): 234–253. 
Chubb J and Watermeyer R (2016) Artifice or integrity in the marketization of 
research impact? Investigating the moral economy of (pathways to) impact 
statements within research funding proposals in the UK and Australia. Studies 
in Higher Education; 1–13. 
Cicchetti DV (1991) The reliability of peer review for manuscript and grant 
submissions: A cross-disciplinary investigation. The Behavioral and Brain 
Sciences; 14 (1): 119–135. 
Claxton LD (2005) Scientific authorship. Part 1. A window into scientific fraud? 
Mutation Research; 589 (1): 17–30. 
Cook I, Grange S and Eyre-Walker A (2015) Research groups: How big should 
they be? PeerJ; 3 (June): e989. 
Costello LC (2010) Perspective: Is NIH funding the ‘best science by the best 
scientists’? A critique of the NIH R01 research grant review policies:. Academic 
Medicine: Journal of the Association of American Medical Colleges; 85 (5): 
775–779. 
Curry S (2012) PLoS ONE: From the Public Library of Sloppiness? Reciprocal 
Space, http://occamstypewriter.org/scurry/2012/04/01/plos1-public-library-of-
sloppiness/, accessed 1 April. 
Dean DG (1989) Structural constraints and the publications dilemma: A review 
and some proposals. The American Sociologist; 20 (2): 181–187. 
Dickersin K (2005) Publication bias: Recognizing the problem, understanding its 
origins and scope, and preventing harm. In: Rothstein HR, Sutton AJ and 
Borenstein M (eds.) Publication Bias in Meta-Analysis; John Wiley & Sons: 
Chichester, UK, pp 9–33 
Dickersin K, Chan S, Chalmersx TC, Sacks HS and Smith H (1987) Publication bias 
and clinical trials. Controlled Clinical Trials; 8 (4): 343–353. 
Dobbs D (2006) Trial and Error. The New York Times 15 January, http://www. 
nytimes.com/2006/01/15/magazine/15wwln_idealab.html?_r=0. 
Ely A, Van Zwanenberg P and Stirling A (2014) Broadening out and opening up 
technology assessment: Approaches to enhance international development, co-
ordination and democratisation. Research Policy; 43 (3): 505–518. 
Eve MP (2014) Open Access and the Humanities: Contexts, Controversies and the 
Future. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK. 
Excellence Academy. (2016) Indiana University, http://iuhoosiers.com/sports/2015/ 
6/25/GEN_0625153134.aspx, accessed 9 September. 
Eyre-Walker A and Stoletzki N (2013) The assessment of science: The relative 
merits of post-publication review, the impact factor, and the number of 
citations. Edited by Jonathan A. Eisen. PLoS Biology; 11 (10): e1001675. 
Fanelli D (2009) How many scientists fabricate and falsify research? A systematic 
review and meta-analysis of survey data. PLoS One; 4 (5): e5738. 
Fanelli D (2011) Negative results are disappearing from most disciplines and 
countries. Scientometrics; 90 (3): 891–904. 
Fang FC, Bowen A and Casadevall A (2016) NIH peer review percentile scores are 
poorly predictive of grant productivity. eLife; 5 (February). doi:10.7554/ 
eLife.13323. 
Fang FC, Steen RG and Casadevall A (2012) Misconduct accounts for the majority 
of retracted scientific publications. Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences of the United States of America; 109 (42): 17028–17033. 
Fitzpatrick K (2011) Planned Obsolescence. New York University Press: New York. 
Fleck L (1979) Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact; Bradley F and Trenn 
TJ (trans). Trenn TJ and Merton RK (eds). University of Chicago Press: 
Chicago, IL. 
Fortin J-M and Currie DJ (2013) Big science vs. Little science: How scientific 
impact scales with funding. PLoS One; 8 (6): e65263. 
Funtowicz SO and Ravetz JR (1990) Uncertainty and Quality in Science for Policy. 
Theory and Decision Library A-Springer: The Netherlands. 
Funtowicz SO and Ravetz JR (2003) Post-Normal Science. In: International Society 
for Ecological Economics Internet Encyclopaedia of Ecological Economics. http:// 
isecoeco.org/pdf/pstnormsc.pdf. 
Gans JS and Shepherd GB (1994) How are the mighty fallen: Rejected classic 
articles by leading economists. The Journal of Economic Perspectives: A Journal 
of the American Economic Association; 8 (1): 165. 
Goldacre B (2011) I Foresee That Nobody Will Do Anything about This Problem. 
Bad Science. 23 April, http://www.badscience.net/2011/04/i-foresee-that-
nobody-will-do-anything-about-this-problem/. 
Gonon F, Konsman J-P, Cohen D and Boraud T (2012) Why most biomedical 
findings echoed by newspapers turn out to be false: The case of attention deficit 
hyperactivity disorder. PLoS One; 7 (9): e44275. 
Goodrich DW (1945) An analysis of manuscripts received by the editors of the 
American Sociological Review from May 1, 1944 to September 1, 1945. American 
Sociological Review; 10 (6): 716–725. 
Gordon R and Poulin BJ (2009) Cost of the NSERC science grant peer review 
system exceeds the cost of giving every qualified researcher a baseline grant. 
Accountability in Research; 16 (1): 13–40. 
Grieneisen ML and Zhang M (2012) A comprehensive survey of retracted articles 
from the scholarly literature. PLoS One; 7 (10): e44118. 
Groppe DM (2015) Combating the scientific decline effect with confidence 
(intervals) BioRχiv. doi:10.1101/034074. 
Guedj D (2009) Nicholas Bourbaki, collective mathematician: An interview with 
Claude Chevalley. The Mathematical Intelligencer; 7 (2): 18–22. 
Hassell MP and May RM (1974) Aggregation of predators and insect parasites and 
its effect on stability. The Journal of Animal Ecology; 43 (2): 567–594. 
Health Research Council of New Zealand (2016) Explorer Grants. Health Research 
Council, http://www.hrc.govt.nz/funding-opportunities/researcher-initiated-pro 
posals/explorer-grants, accessed 19 February. 
Herbert DL, Barnett AG, Clarke P and Graves N (2013) On the time spent 
preparing grant proposals: An observational study of Australian researchers. 
BMJ Open; 3 (5): e002800. 
Herrnstein Smith B (1988) Contingencies of Value: Alternative Perspectives for 
Critical Theory. Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA. 
Hill H and Pitt J (2014) Failure to replicate: A sign of scientific misconduct? 
Publications; 2 (3): 71–82. 
Hoover WG, Moran B, Holian BL, Posch HA and Bestiale S (1988) Computer 
simulation of nonequilibrium processes. In: Schmidt SC and Homes NC (eds) 
Shock Waves in Condensed Matter 1987; North-Holland. pp 191–194. 
Hoover WG, Posch HA and Bestiale S (1987) Dense‐fluid Lyapunov spectra via 
constrained molecular dynamics. The Journal of Chemical Physics; 87 (11): 
6665–6670. 
Ioannidis JPA, Boyack KW, Small H, Sorensen AA and Klavans R (2014) 
Bibliometrics: Is your most cited work your best? Nature; 514 (7524): 561–562. 
Kennedy D (2004) The old file-drawer problem. Science; 305 (5683): 451. 
Kilkenny C, Browne WJ, Cuthill IC, Emerson M and Altman DG (2010) Improving 
bioscience research reporting: The ARRIVE guidelines for reporting animal 
research. PLoS Biology; 8 (6): e1000412. 
King M, West JD, Jacquet J, Correll S and Bergstrom CT (2014) Gender 
Composition of Scholarly Publications. Eigenfactor, http://www.eigenfactor.org/ 
gender/self-citation/, accessed 7 January. 
King MM, Bergstrom CT, Correll SJ, Jacquet J and West JD (2016) Men set their 
own cites high: Gender and self-citation across fields and over time. arXiv 
[physics.soc-ph], http://arxiv.org/abs/1607.00376. 
Kohn A (1999) Punished by Rewards: The Trouble with Gold Stars, Incentive Plans, 
A’s, Praise, and Other Bribes. Houghton Mifflin: Boston, MA. 
Kuhn TS ((1962) 2012) The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Fourth edition, 
University of Chicago Press: Chicago, IL. 
Labbé C (2010) Ike Antkare: One of the great stars in the scientific firmament. ISSI 
Newsletter; 6 (2): 48–52. 
Lamont M (2009) How Professors Think: Inside the Curious World of Academic 
Judgment. Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA. 
Latour B (1987) Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers Through 
Society. Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA. 
PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS | 3:16105 | DOI: 10.1057/palcomms.2016.105 | www.palgrave-journals.com/palcomms 11 
ARTICLE PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS | DOI: 10.1057/palcomms.2016.105 
Latour B and Woolgar S (1986) Laboratory Life: The Construction of Scientific 
Facts. Princeton University Press: Princeton, NJ. 
Lawrence PA (2007) The mismeasurement of science. Current Biology; 17 (15): 
R583–R585. 
Lehrer J (2010) The Truth Wears Off. New Yorker 13 December, http://www. 
newyorker.com/magazine/2010/12/13/the-truth-wears-off. 
Lerner J and Wulf J (2006) Innovation and Incentives: Evidence from Corporate 
R&D. W11944. National Bureau of Economic Research, http://www.nber.org/ 
papers/w11944.pdf. 
Lindner MD and Nakamura RK (2015) Examining the predictive validity of NIH 
peer review scores. PLoS One; 10 (6): e0126938. 
Lord RG, de Vader CL and Alliger GM (1986) A meta-analysis of the relation 
between personality traits and leadership perceptions: An application of validity 
generalization procedures. The Journal of Applied Psychology; 71 (3): 402. 
Lundh A, Barbateskovic M, Hróbjartsson A and Gøtzsche PC (2010) Conflicts of 
interest at medical journals: The influence of industry-supported randomised 
trials on journal impact factors and revenue—Cohort study. PLoS Medicine; 7 
(10): e1000354. 
MacCallum CJ (2011) Why ONE is more than 5. PLoS Biology; 9 (12): e1001235. 
Marcovitch H (2010) Editors, publishers, impact factors, and reprint income. PLoS 
Medicine; 7 (10): e1000355. 
Matzinger P and Mirkwood G (1978) In a fully H-2 incompatible chimera, T cells 
of donor origin can respond to minor histocompatibility antigens in association 
with either donor or host H-2 type. The Journal of Experimental Medicine; 148 
(1): 84–92. 
Meng W (2016) Peer Review: Is NIH Rewarding Talent? Science Transparency, 
https://scienceretractions.wordpress.com/2016/01/10/peer-review-is-nih-reward 
ing-talent/, accessed 10 January. 
Merton RK (1968) The Matthew Effect in science. Science; 159 (3810): 56–63. 
Merton RK (1988) The Matthew Effect in science, II: Cumulative advantage and 
the symbolism of intellectual property. Isis; An International Review Devoted to 
the History of Science and Its Cultural Influences; 79 (4): 606–623. 
Miller S (2015) Excellence and Equity: The National Endowment for the 
Humanities. University Press of Kentucky: Lexington, KY. 
Moran B, Hoover WG and Bestiale S (2016) Diffusion in a periodic Lorentz gas. 
Journal of Statistical Physics; 48 (3–4): 709–726. 
Morgan D (2016) Lessons Learned, and How the Landscape Has Already Changed. 
Lecture presented at the Open Access @ UNT/Library Publishing Forum, 
University of North Texas, 19 May, https://openaccess.unt.edu/symposium/ 
2016/live-streaming-oa-uc-press-lessons-learned-and-how-landscape-has-
already-changed. 
Mrs Kinpaisby (2008) Taking stock of participatory geographies: envisioning the 
communiversity. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers; 33 (3): 
292–299. 
Munafò MR, Stothart G and Flint J (2009) Bias in genetic association studies and 
impact factor. Molecular Psychiatry; 14 (2): 119–120. 
Networks of Centres of Excellence of Canada, Communications. (2015) Networks 
of Centres of Excellence, http://www.nce-rce.gc.ca/index_eng.asp, accessed 13 
April. 
Nicholson JM and Ioannidis JPA (2012) Research grants: Conform and be funded. 
Nature; 492 (7427): 34–36. 
Nielsen MA (2012) Reinventing Discovery: The New Era of Networked Science. 
Princeton University Press: Princeton, NJ. 
Nosek BA, Spies JR and Motyl M (2012) Scientific Utopia: II. Restructuring 
incentives and practices to promote truth over publishability. Perspectives on 
Psychological Science: A Journal of the Association for Psychological Science; 7 
(6): 615–631. 
Nowotny H (2014) Excellence Attracts Excellence--and What about the Rest? 
Reflections on Excellence and Inclusion. Lecture presented at the EMBO–EMBL 
Anniversary Science and Policy Meeting, Heidelberg, July, http://www.helga-
nowotny.eu/downloads/helga_nowotny_b160.pdf. 
O’Connor P and O’Hagan C (2015) Excellence in university academic staff 
evaluation: A problematic reality? Studies in Higher Education; 41 (11): 
1943–1957. 
O’Donnell DP (2015) Could We Design Comparative Metrics That Would Favour 
the Humanities? Daniel Paul O’Donnell, http://people.uleth.ca/ ~ daniel.odon 
nell/Teaching/could-we-design-comparative-metrics-that-would-favour-the-
humanities, accessed 29 March. 
OECD (2014) Chapter 6. The German Excellence Initiative. In: Promoting Research 
Excellence. OECD Publishing, pp 145–163. 
Office of Excellence and Multicultural Student Success (2016) University of Toledo. 
http://www.utoledo.edu/success/excel/, accessed 9 September. 
Open Science Collaboration. (2015) Estimating the reproducibility of psychological 
science. Science; 349 (6251): aac4716. 
Pagano M (2006) American Idol and NIH grant review. Cell; 126 (4): 637–638. 
Peters DP and Ceci SJ (1982) Peer-review practices of psychological journals: The 
fate of published articles, submitted again. The Behavioral and Brain Sciences; 5 
(2): 187–195. 
Potts J, Hartley J, Montgomery L, Neylon C and Rennie E (2016) A Journal is a 
club: A new economic model for scholarly publishing. Social Science Research 
Network (April). doi:10.2139/ssrn.2763975. 
Psych Filedrawer (2016) The Filedrawer Problem. PsychFileDrawer.org, http:// 
www.psychfiledrawer.org/TheFiledrawerProblem.php, accessed 19 February. 
Public Library of Science. (2016) Who we are. PLoS, https://www.plos.org/who-we-
are, accessed 12 May. 
Ravetz JR (1973) Scientific Knowledge and Its Social Problems. Penguin Books: 
London, UK. 
Readings B (1996) The University in Ruins. Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA. 
Rehman J (2013) Cancer Research in Crisis: Are the Drugs We Count on Based on 
Bad Science? Salon, 1 September, http://www.salon.com/2013/09/01/is_cancer_ 
research_facing_a_crisis/. 
Resnik DB and Dinse GE (2013) Scientific retractions and corrections related to 
misconduct findings. Journal of Medical Ethics; 39 (1): 46–50. 
Resnik DB, Wager E and Kissling GE (2015) Retraction policies of top scientific 
journals ranked by impact factor. Journal of the Medical Library Association; 
103 (3): 136–139. 
Roderick GK and Gillespie RG (1998) Speciation and phylogeography of Hawaiian 
terrestrial arthropods. Molecular Ecology; 7 (4): 519–531. 
Roorda S (2009) The real cost of the NSERC peer review is less than 5% of a 
proposed baseline grant. Accountability in Research; 16 (4): 229–231. 
Rothstein HR (2014) Publication bias. In: Wiley StatsRef: Statistics Reference 
Online. John Wiley & Sons. 
Schooler J (2011) Unpublished results hide the decline effect. Nature; 470 (7335): 
437. 
Schulz KF, Altman DG, Moher D and CONSORT Group (2010) CONSORT 2010 
statement: Updated guidelines for reporting parallel group randomised trials. BMJ; 
340 (March): c332. 
Secord JA (2015) Visions of Science: Books and Readers at the Dawn of the 
Victorian Age. University of Chicago Press: Chicago, IL. 
Şekercioğlu ÇH (2013) Citation opportunity cost of the high impact factor 
obsession. Current Biology; 23 (17): R701–R702. 
Sewitz S (2014) The Excellence Agenda Is a Trojan Horse for Austerity. Research, 
http://www.researchresearch.com/index.php?option=com_news&template=rr_ 
2col&view=article&articleId=1346207, accessed 3 September. 
Shirky C (2010) Cognitive Surplus: Creativity and Generosity in a Connected Age. 
Penguin Press: New York. 
Siler K, Lee K and Bero L (2015) Measuring the effectiveness of scientific 
gatekeeping. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences; 112 (2): 360–365. 
Simons DJ, Holcombe AO and Spellman BA (2014) An introduction to registered 
replication reports at Perspectives on Psychological Science. Perspectives on 
Psychological Science; 9 (5): 552–555. 
Smith R (2006) Research misconduct: The poisoning of the well. Journal of the 
Royal Society of Medicine; 99 (5): 232–237. 
Solomon DJ (2014) A survey of authors publishing in four megajournals. PeerJ; 2 
(April): e365. 
Steen RG (2011) Retractions in the scientific literature: Is the incidence of research 
fraud increasing? Journal of Medical Ethics; 37 (4): 249–253. 
Sterling TD (1959) Publication decisions and their possible effects on inferences 
drawn from tests of significance—Or vice versa. Journal of the American 
Statistical Association; 54 (285): 30–34. 
Stilgoe J (2014) Against Excellence. The Guardian 19 December, https://www. 
theguardian.com/science/political-science/2014/dec/19/against-excellence. 
Stirling A (2007a) ‘Opening up’ and ‘Closing down’: Power, participation, and 
pluralism in the social appraisal of technology. Science, Technology & Human 
Values; 33 (2): 262–294. 
Stirling A (2007b) A general framework for analysing diversity in science, 
technology and society. Journal of the Royal Society, Interface / the Royal Society; 
4 (15): 707–719. 
Sustaining Excellence Awards.. (2016) Wellcome Trust, http://www.wellcome.ac.uk/ 
Funding/Public-engagement/Funding-schemes/Sustaining-Excellence-Awards/ 
index.htm, accessed 19 May. 
Tartamelia V (2014) The True Story of Stronzo Bestiale (and Other Scientific 
Jokes). Parolacce, http://www.parolacce.org/2014/10/05/the-true-story-of-
stronzo-bestiale/, 5 October. 
The Economist. (2015) The World Is Going to University, http://www.economist. 
com/news/leaders/21647285-more-and-more-money-being-spent-higher-educa 
tion-too-little-known-about-whether-it. 
The University of Tokyo Global Center of Excellence. (2016) Global Center of 
Excellence for Mechanical Systems Innovation. The University of Tokyo Global 
COE, http://www.u-tokyo.ac.jp/coe/english/list/category2/base7/summary.html 
accessed 12 May. 
Tian X and Wang TY (2011) Tolerance for failure and corporate innovation. The 
Review of Financial Studies (December). doi:10.1093/rfs/hhr130. 
Tijdink JK, Verbeke R and Smulders YM (2014) Publication pressure and scientific 
misconduct in medical scientists. Journal of Empirical Research on Human 
Research Ethics; 9 (5): 64–71. 
PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS | 3:16105 | DOI: 10.1057/palcomms.2016.105 | www.palgrave-journals.com/palcomms 12 
PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS | DOI: 10.1057/palcomms.2016.105 ARTICLE 
U15 Group of Canadian Research Universities/Regroupement des universités de 
recherche du Canada. (2016) Our Impact. U15, http://u15.ca/our-impact, 
accessed 18 May. 
University Grants Commission. (2016) Universities (UPE). University Grants 
Commission, http://www.ugc.ac.in/page/Universities-(UPE).aspx, accessed 19 
February. 
University of Arizona Commission on the Status of Women. (2015) Avoiding 
Gender Bias in Reference Writing. University of Arizona: Tucson, AZ, 
http://www.csw.arizona.edu/sites/default/files/csw_2015-10-20_lorbias_pdf_0. 
pdf. 
USC Center for Excellence in Teaching. (2016) http://cet.usc.edu/, accessed 12 
May. 
Usher A (2016) Massification Causes Stratification. Higher Education Strategy 
Associates, http://higheredstrategy.com/massification-causes-stratification/, 
accessed 5 May. 
Vessuri H, Guedon J-C, Cetto and Mara A (2014) Excellence or quality? Impact of 
the current competition regime on science and scientific publishing in Latin 
America and its implications for development. Current Sociology; 62 (5): 
647–665. 
Wang J, Veugelers R and Stephan PE (2016) Bias against novelty in science: A 
cautionary tale for users of bibliometric indicators. Social Science Research 
Network; (January). doi:10.2139/ssrn.2710572. 
Weigley S and Hess AEM (2013) Universities Getting the Most Government 
Money. 247wallst.com, http://247wallst.com/special-report/2013/04/25/universi 
ties-getting-the-most-government-money/, accessed 25 April. 
Weller AC (2001) Editorial Peer Review: Its Strengths and Weaknesses. Information 
Today: Medford NJ. 
Wilson A (2011) Failing to Replicate Bem’s Ability to Get Published in a Major 
Journal. Notes from Two Scientific Psychologists, http://psychsciencenotes. 
blogspot.ca/2011/05/failing-to-replicate-bems-ability-to.html, accessed 7 May. 
Wittgenstein L (2001) Philosophical Investigations: The German Text, with a 
Revised English Translation. Blackwell: Oxford, UK. 
Yong Ed. (2012a) A Failed Replication Draws a Scathing Personal Attack from a 
Psychology Professor. Not Exactly Rocket Science, http://blogs.discovermaga 
zine.com/notrocketscience/2012/03/10/failed-replication-bargh-psychology-
study-doyen/#.VsZpH0Leezc, accessed 10 March. 
Yong E (2012b) Replication studies: Bad copy. Nature; 485 (7398): 298–300. 
Young NS, Ioannidis JPA and Al-Ubaydli O (2008) Why current publication 
practices may distort science. PLoS Medicine; 5 (10). doi:10.1371/journal. 
pmed.0050201. 
Young SS and Bang H (2004) The file-drawer problem, revisited. Science; 306 
(5699): 1133–1134. 
Zankl H (2003) Fälscher, Schwindler, Scharlatane. Erlebnis Wissenschaft. Wiley-
VCH Verlag: Weinheim. 
Data availability 
Data sharing is not applicable as no datasets were analysed or generated during this 
study. 
Author Contributions 
The corresponding author is cn. Author contributions, described using the CASRAI 
CRedIT typology (http://casrai.org/credit), are as follows: conceptualization: me, sm, cn, 
dod, dp; methodology: me, sm, cn, dod, dp; investigation: me, sm, cn, dod, dp; resources: 
me, sm, cn, dod, dp; writing – original draft preparation: me, cn, dod; writing – review 
and editing: me, sm, cn, dod, dp; funding acquisition: sm. 
Acknowledgements 
In keeping with our argument, and following an extensive tradition of subverting tra-
ditional scarce markers of prestige, the authors have adopted a redistributive approach to 
the order of their names in the byline. As an international collaboration of uniformly nice 
people (cf. Moran et al., 2016; Hoover et al., 1987; see Tartamelia, 2014 for an expla-
nation), lacking access to a croquet field (cf. Hassell and May, 1974), writing as indivi-
duals rather than an academic version of the Borg (see Guedj, 2009), and not identifying 
any excellent pun (cf. Alpher et al., 1948; Lord et al., 1986) or “disarmingly quaint nom 
de guerre” (cf. Mrs Kinpaisby, 2008, 298 [thanks to Oli Duke-Williams for this 
reference]) to be made from the ordering of our names, we elected to assign index 
numbers to our surnames and randomize these using an online tool. For the avoidance of 
doubt, while several of the authors have pets, none of them are included as authors (cf. 
Matzinger and Mirkwood, 1978); none of us are approaching a tenure decision (cf. 
Roderick and Gillespie, 1998); and none of us are fictional entities who generate their 
papers algorithmically using SciGen (see Labbé, 2010 for the contrasting case of “Ike 
Antkare,” who nevertheless greatly outranked all the authors of this paper on several 
formal measures of excellence before being outed). This article arose from a meeting at 
the Triangle Scholarly Communications Institute funded by the Andrew W. Mellon 
Foundation. The authors wish to thank Ben Johnson, and commenters on Hacker News 
for their criticisms and comments on an earlier version of this manuscript. 
Additional information 
Competing interests: Moore, Neylon, and Pattinson are all previous employees of PLOS. 
Eve and O'Donnell declare no competing interests. 
Reprints and permission information is available at http://www.palgrave-journals.com/ 
pal/authors/rights_and_permissions.html 
How to cite this article: Moore S et al. (2017) “Excellence R Us”: university research and 
the fetishisation of excellence. Palgrave Communications. 3:16105 doi: 10.1057/ 
palcomms.2016.105. 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 
International License. The images or other third party material in this 
article are included in the article’s Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise 
in the credit line; if the material is not included under the Creative Commons license, 
users will need to obtain permission from the license holder to reproduce the material. 
To view a copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ 
PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS | 3:16105 | DOI: 10.1057/palcomms.2016.105 | www.palgrave-journals.com/palcomms 13 
